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Abstract—Low cost wireless solutions for safety-critical ap-
plications are attractive to leverage safety-critical operation
in new application areas. This work assesses the feasibility of
providing synchronous and time bounded communication to
standard IEEE 802.11 devices with low effort modifications. An
existing protocol for time bounded communication in wireless
systems is adapted to a generic safety-critical application
with low bandwidth requirements, but strict bounds on time
behavior. Experimental and simulation studies are conducted
in which the protocol is implemented on top of IEEE 802.11e
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). The experimental
results for packet loss ratio, communication delays, and broad-
cast completion are used to calibrate a stochastic simulation
model that allows to extrapolate the expected long-term per-
formance of the protocol. Both the experimental results and
the simulation extrapolation show that necessary availability
requirements can be met with 802.11e prioritization in the
investigated cross-traffic and interference scenarios.
Keywords: Safety-critical, Synchronous protocols,
TDMA, 802.11e DCF, Experimental & Simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing cost-efficient wireless communication solu-
tions for high dependability and safety applications is at-
tractive to 1) enable safety-critical automation for scenarios
which currently rely on manual processes such as assisted
vehicle driving and 2) to replace existing (wired) automation
systems which lack flexibility in installation and are poten-
tially too costly to deploy widely. An example case of the
latter is presented in this paper considering an automated
alerting system for railway workers utilizing wirelessly
connected personal devices to issue alerts about approaching
trains.
Wireless communication link reliability depends on the
actual distances between the nodes, which varies in mobile
settings, on the presence of obstacles, and on possible
interference from other transmitting devices or noise sources.
When transmitting on a shared communication medium,
with a possibly unbounded number of participating nodes
and various procedures for channel access, timing faults have
to be accepted. Executing critical distributed services and
achieving the required reliability, safety and timeliness of
the communication through portable and wireless devices in
harsh environments requires the design of resilient services
and networks [1], [2].
A driver for wireless communication solutions has in
the past decade been the IEEE 802.11 standard. Today
it represents the de-facto technology to enable ubiquitous
wireless access solutions for private and enterprise users.
However, the standard is now also defining the basis for
new automation solutions such as wireless communication
infrastructure for intelligent transportation systems 802.11p
[3] and is intended for data collection, monitoring and
control in industrial applications.
In general, low cost solutions based on IEEE 802.11
are manufactured primarily with focus on performance.
Thus, integral features needed for high dependability and
safety are lacking such as synchronous and time bounded
communication. How to provide such properties in wireless
communication is a well studied topic, see [4]. However,
many existing solutions require low level modifications to
hardware and software which increases cost.
In this work, a practical approach is taken to evaluate
a timed reliable communication solution operating on top
of the standard 802.11 protocol stack with off-the-shelf
hardware. The approach entails:
• Use the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), a
carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
technique for sharing the channel among multiple
nodes, in addition to the widely available 802.11e for
medium access priority control.
• Use an existing reliable group communication proto-
col, and adapt its assumptions and properties (validity,
agreement, integrity, ordering) to our use-case scenario.
• Evaluate communication reliability and performance in
an experimental study with and without contending
nodes.
• Develop a stochastic simulation model of the protocol
for a feasibility analysis to extrapolate the results, and
assess expected long-term protocol behavior in a full
scenario setup.
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The protocol is intended to operate in the context of the
ALARP (A railway automatic track warning system based
on distributed personal mobile terminals [5]) project, where
real-time and safety-critical communication is required to
transmit information to wireless devices carried by rail-
way trackside workers. The wireless communication layer
needs to deliver both life-critical messages (in particular,
notification of trains approaching the worksite), as well as
non-life critical messages. The protocol presented in this
paper is devised starting from the ALARP requirements and
a previous protocol, the Real-time Group Communication
Protocol (RGCP, [6] [7]).
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the use-case of the alert system for railway workers, and
points out the key requirements driving the communication
protocol design. That section also provides the background
on the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF) protocol and channel access prioritization options
using IEEE 802.11e. Section III introduces the synchronous
communication reference protocol, and describes the adap-
tations of this protocol to the ALARP scenario. The experi-
mental and model based evaluations of the modified protocol
realization are introduced in Section IV to assess its mea-
sured and expected performance. This part also constitutes
the focus of this paper. Finally, Section V concludes the
results and provides an outlook to future safety-oriented
analysis of the protocol.
Related Work: Several approaches exist for applying
Quality of Service (QoS) for real-time communication in
IEEE 802.11 networks. Reference [8] evaluates different
schemes, also covering techniques for low latency real-time
communication like Blackburst [9], which requires jamming
the wireless medium. Also, new software-based time slots
coordination mechanism were proposed [10], with the main
target being Voice-over-IP communication [11].
II. SAFETY-CRITICAL COMMUNICATION SCENARIO
This section introduces the safety-critical communication
scenario, which guides our further studies of experimental
test setups and developing our simulation models. The sce-
nario covers the safety of railway workers at work sites near
railway tracks, which can be easily generalized to similar
setups. Hence, the motivation of studying such use-cases is
not limited to railway-specific scenarios.
Safety of workers in railway scenario is a serious concern,
since vehicles are constrained to tracks and drivers have
much less margins to react in case of emergencies; therefore,
trackside workers are exposed to injuries and fatalities [12],
[13]. The ALARP [5] project proposes to design, develop
and validate an Automatic Track Warning System to improve
the safety of trackside workers. This system will be able
to inform the trackside workers about approaching trains
on the track. Additionally, it will keep track of the status
and position of the workers, to identify those at risk, not
responding, or to suggest escape routes [14], [15].
The ALARP architecture is based on the following
components realized on top of Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) hardware: i) the trackside Train Presence Alert
Device (TPAD), able to sense an approaching train on
the interested track without interfering with the signaling
system, using long-range multi-spectral cameras and eaves-
dropping the train-network communication, ii) a set of dis-
tributed, low-cost, wearable, context-aware, robust, trustable
and highly reliable, wireless Mobile Terminals (MTs) to
inform the workers about possible approaching trains and/or
other events that could put at risk their safety, and iii)
infrastructure for wireless communication. The MT will be
able to generate alarms, and to communicate and interact
through wireless connections with other MTs and the track-
side train presence alert devices [14], [15].
High reliability, timeliness and safety, despite the possible
harsh conditions are mandatory requirements of the ALARP
communication, as alarms raised by the TPAD are safety-
critical messages that need to be timely delivered to all the
workers. For safety reasons, violations of timing bounds
will have to be detected and will (after remediation actions)
finally lead to sending subset of workers to safe zones; this
would impact the working procedures leading to loss of
productivity.
A. Communication Architecture
The overall communication architecture in ALARP fol-
lows a centralized communication setup. This enables better
predictability of the communication timing and simplified
realization of synchronous communication channels at the
worksite, see Figure 1. This setup is primarily based on
a fixed coordinator located at the worksite, with all MTs
communicating via the coordinator [14]. The deployed timed
reliable wireless communication protocol is using the coor-
dinator to implement its centralized communication algo-
rithm and maintain allocation of necessary communication
resources. Communication links between TPAD and the
worksite might be enhanced by helper infrastructure in form
of additional relay nodes (or repeaters) at the transmission
path. At the worksite, TPAD information is disseminated to
MTs via the coordinator.
The overall communication solution maintains the com-
munication layer (of the MTs and TPADs) in a known com-
munication state. It also adheres to safety requirements, and
timely decides on missing nodes as well as nodes deviating
from the expected operation behavior, enforcing communi-
cation timeouts. The process of sending and delivering a
message is bounded by a maximum time delay requirement;
typical values are in the order of several seconds. In ALARP,
this time requirement is set to 10 seconds.
The communication protocol adopted in ALARP shall al-
low the communication layer to reliably distribute messages.
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Figure 1. Communication architecture of the alert system for railway
workers: workers are equipped with a Mobile Terminal (MT).
It offers broadcast (distribution to all nodes), multicast (one-
to-many communication), and unicast (message exchange
between two dedicated nodes) communication primitives.
The reliability requirement is defined to match three differ-
ent message criticalities, coming with a specific resilience
degree for messages and probability of message delivery.
For this, the communication layer offers the three criticality
levels, or message classes: high for safety-critical messages
(life-critical messages as notification to the workers of a
train approaching the worksite, health problems of a worker,
etc.), medium for messages which are not safety-critical but
if not timely received may affect system availability (e.g.,
the message which notifies that a dangerous situation ended
and work can restart), and low for messages with no special
requirements (best-effort messages, e.g., the message an MT
transmits to notify all MTs that it is being switched off by
its user).
In the following sections, we focus on the timed reliable
broadcast approach that is operated between the coordinator
and all MTs over COTS Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) technology.
B. Background on 802.11 Coordination Functions
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies two channel access
coordination functions, the Distributed Coordination Func-
tion (DCF), and the Point Coordination Function (PCF),
summarized in the following.
Distributed Coordination Function: WLAN 802.11
uses a carrier-sense multiple access scheme with collision
avoidance on the Media Access Control (MAC) layer, a
sublayer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
data-link layer (Layer 2). We here summarize the basic
mechanism, see [16] for details. 802.11 nodes that have a
Layer 2 frame ready to transmit, first sense the channel: if
it is idle for a certain time interval (referred to as Inter-
Frame Space (IFS)), the fragment is transmitted immedi-
ately. Otherwise, the nodes enter into a random backoff
procedure, where the backoff counter is chosen uniformly
between two Contention Window (CW) bounds (CWmin
and CWmax), referring to the lower and upper bound,
respectively. Values for the CW are given in slot time units,
with the duration of a single slot specified by 802.11. The
upper bound is increased upon unsuccessful transmissions in
order to provide adaptivity to congestion levels, i.e., number
of contending nodes. Time periods during which the medium
is used by other nodes lead a node to temporarily pause its
count-down to access the medium. When the backoff counter
reaches 0, the frame is transmitted and the sending node
listens for an Acknowledgment (Ack) from the receiver. The
Acks are prioritized on the channel, as the medium access
procedures are performed with lower IFS for those. If the
sending node does not correctly receive an Ack in a certain
time interval, it assumes that the transmission has failed; it
then increases the upper bound (CWmax) for the backoff
counter, and retransmits the fragment with the same MAC
procedure. This MAC DCF procedure is symmetric, all
nodes implement it in the same way. Due to the symmetric
contention scheme, access delays vary and depend on the
number of contending nodes as well as on transmission
errors (due to the impact on backoff counter bounds).
Point Coordination Function: In order to make medium
access delays more predictable, a scheme called Point Co-
ordination Function (PCF) has been defined as a part of
the IEEE 802.11 specification. The access scheme uses the
same MAC procedures, but a coordinator (the access point)
provides centralised medium arbitration, prioritizing channel
access by utilizing shorter inter-frame spaces for part of the
communication. With such higher prioritized frames, it polls
the set of nodes for up-link data, i.e., data to be transmitted
from a node to the access point. During that Contention Free
Period (CFP), the access point grants exclusive access to the
medium by transmitting a polling message to some node in
the set of nodes. Although this technique avoids contention,
the problem of message losses still remains. Further details
can be found in [17].
However, PCF does not provide strict time guarantees
on its CFP repetition interval and on delays for channel
access with multiple PCF coordinators operating on the same
channel. Besides, PCF mode is nowadays seeing extremely
limited support by available COTS WLAN devices, making
it not the preferable choice.
An alternative is to implement the polling for medium
access coordination from the higher layer protocols; the
second feature, prioritization of polling messages compared
to other DCF traffic, can then be achieved by utilizing fea-
tures of the 802.11e standard. Two features are of particular
interest: 1) the use of different inter-frame spaces, and 2) the
modification of bounds of random backoff intervals. Both
of these can be implemented via 802.11e mechanisms, see
[18] for details. The way these are used in the experimental
implementation is described in Section IV-A.
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III. THE TIMED RELIABLE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
This section presents the Timed Reliable Communication
protocol (TRC), the real-time communication protocol we
designed for 802.11 communication between devices within
the ALARP worksite. This protocol is built by modifying the
Real-time Group Communication Protocol (RGCP [6], [7]).
After presenting the RGCP, the TRC protocol is described,
in terms of changes applied to the RGCP protocol. While
the RGCP is based on the assumptions of 802.11 PCF, our
adapted protocol is targeted for use on top of 802.11 DCF,
with the differences explained in Sections II-B and III-C.
A. The base protocol RGCP
The RGCP provides reliable and efficient group commu-
nication services, relying on the IEEE 802.11 PCF and on a
centralised coordinator (Access Point (AP)). The coordinator
schedules channel access for a group of nodes. The AP
grants exclusive access to the medium by transmitting a
polling message to some node in the group. Hence, the
RGCP is based on the assumption of the PCF providing
its contention free node slotting mechanism.
Before entering into details of the protocol we present
its assumptions and properties. The RGCP is based on the
following fault assumptions:
• Messages sent during the CFP are either lost (omission
fault), or are delivered correctly within a fixed time-
bound tm. The losses may be asymmetric i.e., some
nodes may receive a broadcast message and some
may not. The number of consecutive message losses is
assumed to be bounded by a so-called Omission Degree
OD [19] that denotes an upper bound on the number
of omission faults that may affect a single message. In
the case of a broadcast message, this means that after
OD + 1 transmissions every receiver has received at
least one of these transmissions.
• Nodes may suffer crash failures or, due to their mobil-
ity, may leave the reach of the AP at arbitrary points
in time (without crashing). This resembles a permanent
crash of the link between the AP and the leaving node.
• The AP is stable, i.e., not subject to any kind of error.
We here briefly discuss, and later analyze, the assumption
on the omission degree OD. Every protocol that intends to
guarantee reliable transmission and real-time properties on
an unreliable medium must base on this [6] or define a fault-
detection procedure for fault coverage. OD in our setting
can be seen as a parameter that can be optimized in order
to address the following trade-off: i) selecting an OD large
enough to ensure that the coverage of the assumption on
the semantics of the omission degree is large enough, and
ii) minimizing the additional overhead created by an overly
large choice of OD and assuring that the protocol can be
executed within the required time-bounds.
The RGCP satisfies the properties of:
• Validity. If a correct station broadcasts a message m
then it eventually delivers m [20].
• Agreement. If a correct station delivers a message m
then all correct stations eventually deliver m [20]. Note
that validity together with agreement ensures that a
message broadcast by a correct station is delivered by
all correct stations.
• Integrity. For any message m every correct station
delivers m at most once and only if m was previously
broadcast by its sender [20].
• Total order. If the messages m1 and m2 are delivered
by stations s1 and s2, then station s1 delivers message
m1 before message m2 if and only if station s2 delivers
message m1 before m2.
The RGCP communication is structured into rounds. Dur-
ing each round, the AP polls each node of the group exactly
once. After being polled, a node returns a broadcast request
message to the access point, which assigns a sequence
number to that message and broadcasts it to the node group.
The broadcast request message is also used to acknowledge
each of the preceding broadcasts by piggy-backing a bit field
on the header of the request message. Each bit is used to
acknowledge one of the preceding broadcasts.
By this, one round after sending a broadcast message,
the access point is able to decide whether each group
member has received the message or not. In the latter case,
the access point will retransmit the affected message. By
the assumptions made above, a message is successfully
transmitted after at most OD+1 rounds.
If the AP does not receive the request message within a
certain period of time after polling the node, it considers
the request message (or polling message) to be lost, and
transmits the last broadcast message of the not responding
node if it has not yet been acknowledged by all nodes. If
the AP does not receive the request message from a node
for more than OD consecutive times, it considers that node
to have left the group and broadcasts a message indicating
the change in the group membership.
To enable the user to improve the timing guarantees,
the parameter resiliency degree is introduced, to allow the
user specifying the maximum number of retransmissions
of the messages. This resiliency degree res(c) represents
a bound on message retransmissions, which may vary for
different message classes c. A value res(c) smaller than
OD allows trading reliability of message transmission for
shorter transmission delays.
The modification introduced in the protocol to consider
the resiliency degree are as follow. If a message m is
acknowledged by all nodes after at most res(c) + 1 rounds,
the AP issues the decision to deliver m to the applications,
through the broadcast of a decision message, which is re-
transmittedOD+1 consecutive times (to guarantee reception
by all correct nodes). If, however, the AP does not receive
the acknowledgement of any node after res(c) + 1 rounds,
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a decision not to deliver m is issued, again through the
broadcast of a decision message.
It can be noted that the introduction of the resiliency
degree brings advantages of shorter delivery time for a
message, obtained by reducing the maximum number of
retransmissions for a broadcast message to res(c) times,
but comes at the cost of violation of the validity property.
Now, a message requested to be broadcast by a correct
node may not be received by all the other nodes and
therefore not delivered. However, the agreement, integrity
and total ordering properties are retained (total ordering and
agreement are preserved thanks to the introduction of the
decision message).
B. The Timed Reliable Communication (TRC) protocol
The TRC protocol for communication within the worksite
is presented by showing modifications and differences w.r.t
the RGCP (with resiliency degree) that were applied to fit the
ALARP requirements. Three key modifications are identified
and described in what follows.
Modification 1. In ALARP there is no need to guarantee
total ordering and agreement. Regarding total ordering, it is
not required that the broadcasted messages are delivered ac-
cording to a total order because each message is independent
from the others.
Regarding agreement, in ALARP a message may not be
delivered to all correct nodes. In fact, each node of the
worksite contains its own means to detect the potential loss
of critical messages, and react accordingly (e.g., by using
timeouts to detect message loss and by safely notifying to
the worker the potential hazardous condition due to such
loss). Moreover, as soon as a node receives a message, it
can start to process it. This implies, that two different nodes
can have an inconsistent view of the ALARP system at a
given point in time.
Consequently, the TRC protocol relaxes agreement and
ordering properties by removing the decision message, that
is no more transmitted by the AP. This further shortens the
delivery time of a message.
Modification 2. While RGCP is intended only for broad-
cast, in ALARP reliable broadcast, multicast and unicast
are required. The TRC protocol introduces unicast and
multicast using a scheme very similar to broadcast. In case
of multicast, the procedure is the same but a polled node
needs to: i) specify that it wants to transmit a multicast
message, and ii) transmit the multicast mask, which enlists
the recipients of the multicast. In case of unicast, once polled
by the AP, a node simply needs to reply that it has a unicast
message for a specific recipient Y .
It is important to note that introducing multicast and
unicast requires to further extend the header of the mes-
sages, to include the additional information needed (the
recipient of the unicast message, or the multicast mask).
This modification also requires to further extend the logic
of the AP. In the RGCP, each messages is retransmitted
until it is acknowledged by all nodes (or the bounds on
allowed retransmissions are reached). This requires that the
AP simply needs to collect acks from all nodes. Instead
in TRC, to define the delivery status of each message, the
AP needs to remember if the acknowledged message is a
unicast, multicast or broadcast (and the intended recipients),
and define accordingly the delivery status of the message.
Modification 3. The formulation of the RGCP introduces
the resilience degree res(c) for different reliability classes,
and actually consider the possibility of using different mes-
sages classes (reliability levels); however this is not applied
explicitly in the usage of the protocol in [6], [7]. The
resiliency degree res(c) in ALARP is set to three different
values that match the three corresponding message classes
introduced in Section II-A:
1) Level high = res(high);
2) Level medium = res(medium);
3) Level low = res(low).
It is expected that res(high) ≥ res(medium) ≥ res(low).
Information on the message level has to be communicated
by the broadcasting node (after receiving the poll from the
AP), by properly extending the header of the message.
Table I summarizes the main differences between TRC
and RGCP.
Table I
COMPARISON OF RGCP AND TRC.
RGCP TRC
(with res(c))
Provides Validity no no
Provides Agreement yes no
Provides Integrity yes yes
Provides Total Ordering yes no
Accepts levels of reliability yes yes
for message delivery
Supports Broadcast yes yes
Supports Multicast no yes
Supports Unicast no yes
C. TRC Protocol Modifications for DCF
The TRC protocol for the ALARP system is based on
802.11 DCF, and not PCF mode as the base RGCP. This
requires additional TRC functionality, because the proto-
col cannot rely on PCF contention free periods, built-in
maintenance of the node polling list, and the node polling
mechanism.
Therefore, the TRC coordinator is enhanced with a sched-
uler which takes care of polling a defined set of nodes for
the required protocol time-slotting, similar to PCF. Within
a protocol slot, the coordinator’s poll packet or the node’s
request packet can be lost, or a node might not reply at
all. To cover those cases, an additional configurable intra-
slot time parameter, the Poll-Request Failed Timeout (P+R
Failed Timeout) is introduced. This parameter specifies the
longest time delay within one slot before the coordinator
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sends the broadcast packet. This ensures that even with a
failed poll or request transmission, a minimum slot length
is left to enable the broadcast packet to be sent.
DCF communication in a selected 802.11 channel will
introduce time delay of sending nodes due to the channel
sensing and backoff algorithm in the presence of other con-
tending nodes. Although the set of protocol communication
nodes (within one ALARP worksite) will be scheduled ac-
cording to a predefined sequence known to the coordinator,
and hence, will not contend, this does not hold for any
other node. With 802.11 DCF operating in a shared medium
and an a-priori unknown number of contending nodes in
the same channel, no upper time bound with transmission
guarantee is provided. To mitigate that serious drawback,
TRC communication is prioritized as far as possible. To
get an advantage in terms of more aggressive access to the
channel, the TRC protocol is applying a Quality of Service
(QoS) scheme of IEEE 802.11e. In particular, transmission
is using a shorter IFS and a lower CW_min setting.
This conforms with our approach of avoiding any hardware
and low-layer driver software modifications. The detailed
parameter settings are described in Section IV-A.
In summary, the DCF version of the timed reliable broad-
cast protocol includes the following features:
• Explicit polling and maintenance of node membership
by additional AP software on top of WLAN Layer 2.
• Introduction of a timeout mechanism at the AP in
order to send broadcast messages within a slot despite
missing requests messages from the polled node.
The realization of the protocol on top of 802.11 uses the
following WLAN configuration settings:
• Prioritization of messages via shorter inter-frame spaces
and shorter backoff window sizes using 802.11e.
• Deactivation of Layer 2 retransmissions in order to
reduce the variability of Layer-2 transmission times.
The following evaluation section investigates to what
extent different parameter settings influence broadcast avail-
ability and reliability of this extended approach. One im-
portant aspect is the coverage of the OD assumption, whose
violation is assumed to lead to a disconnect of the node. The
analysis addresses the question, whether a time to disconnect
can be achieved which is in a feasible range of at least
several hours for realistic parameter choices and settings.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL AND MODEL STUDY
To evaluate the TRC protocol in an IEEE 802.11 DCF
setting both experimental and simulation-model based stud-
ies have been conducted. The main objective of the study
is to characterize the protocol performance for the DCF
realization. The protocol is implemented in a testbed with
a limited number of clients. From experimental results in
the testbed, the protocol behavior in a real-world scenario
can be established. An important part of this analysis is to
define how DCF channel contention aspects affect the in-
slot packet delay characteristics. This characterization, in the
form of transmission delay distributions, is then applied in
a stochastic simulation model developed by the authors for
this purpose. Subsequently, this stochastic simulation model
enables extrapolated analysis to assess the expected long-
term operation behavior of the protocol scaled to different
scenarios. In the following section the TRC protocol testbed
realization is described.
A. Protocol Realization
The TRC protocol implementation consists of two parts:
one part is executed on a coordinator, and the other one at
each protocol communication node. The coordinator does
the node polling and takes care of distributing the messages
as explained in the protocol description section. For the
experimental evaluation, only broadcast messages are dis-
tributed, to delimit the analysis. The protocol performance
is evaluated by sending high-priority messages, i.e., using
the highest resilience class. Here, a node is then defined to
become disconnected when it cannot be reached after OD
+ 1 rounds. Such disconnection cases are measured in the
experimental system and further analyzed in the simulation
model.
For realizing the coordinator, an 802.11 Access Point (AP)
is used. The main selection criterion for the AP is that it
provides an Atheros chipset for wireless communication;
this chipset allows an easy configuration and adaption to
our needs using an Open-Source driver implementation.
The selected AP uses the Atheros AR9287-BL1A chipset,
supporting b/g/n communication and having two external
detachable antennas.
The standard firmware of the AP has been replaced with
OpenWrt [21], a Linux distribution for embedded devices,
using the latest trunk version. The adapted TRC protocol is
targeted to run on the AP, and therefore implemented using
the OpenWrt Linux application programming interfaces.
Messages are sent as Internet Protocol (IP) packets using
Linux socket interfaces. The sources have been compiled to
an OpenWrt package and installed on the AP.
The communication protocol client nodes are executed
on a netbook and laptop, respectively, both running Debian,
Kernel version 2.6.32-5. The external wireless communica-
tion device uses a RALINK RT2870F chipset and is attached
via USB cable to the computer.
To ensure sufficient processor time slices, all protocol
process priorities are increased to the highest possible.
For realizing TRC communication with 802.11e QoS,
both coordinator and client nodes have to support and
enable the 802.11e Wi-Fi Multimedia extensions. An early
experimental communication test setup conducted in the
beginning of the tests have provided the appropriate set
of 802.11e configuration values to compete in cross-traffic
scenarios. Based on those results, the 802.11 Enhanced
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Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) category parameter is
set to voice (AC_V O), with the Arbitration Inter Frame
Space (AIFS) to 1, and Contention Windows (CW) to 4
(CWmin) and 7 (CWmax). The wireless communication
uses the 802.11b mode with a physical rate of 11MBit/s for
all measurements (including both protocol member nodes
and contending nodes for cross-traffic). Data-link layer re-
transmissions are disabled on both the coordinator and client
side to mitigate time delay variations within one slot caused
by the standard 802.11 binary exponential backoff algorithm;
therefore, all retransmissions are performed via the TRC
protocol. Because the AP chipset does not allow to reset the
maximum retransmission retry count to 0, all AP packets are
sent as broadcast frames, thereby avoiding retransmissions.
(Hence, with no retransmission, the CWmax value does not
affect channel access.) Re-enabling Layer 2 retransmission
in a future deployment does not affect TRC protocol func-
tionality, but can adversely influence the intra-slot packet
delays. The TRC protocol parameter P+R Failed Timeout is
set to 40ms.
B. Evaluation Approach and Metrics
The study of the protocol realized on DCF is taking a
starting point in the execution of two scenarios: 1) No cross-
traffic - the protocol is executed in an environment with
limited traffic (caused by a few distant access points) in
the same channel. This setting will provide a reference for
the protocol operation under good conditions. 2) With cross-
traffic – other wireless nodes are introduced in the channel
to contend heavily for the channel resources. This setting is
relevant to clarify the impact on the packet loss and message
delay in scenarios when the TRC protocol will not have
exclusive channel rights.
Obtaining long-term behavior of the TRC protocol is
important to establish the suitability of the protocol realiza-
tion for the described application scenario. Obtaining such
assessments from an experimental setup is, however, time
consuming and impractical as the execution conditions can
be difficult to control. Instead, a model of the protocol logic
has been implemented in a MATLAB simulation model. The
model uses packet loss rates ( ̂PLR) and empirical trans-
mission delay distributions estimated from the experimental
studies. Subsequently, the model enables extrapolations of
the measurement results to different protocol parameteriza-
tions.
To characterize the communication channel properties and
the overall TRC protocol behavior, the following metrics are
measured in the experimental setup:
Packet Loss Ratio (PLR): The packet loss ratio
describes the ratio of packets lost in relation to transmission
attempts sent. The PLR is used as an estimate of the packet
loss probability. The same packet loss probability is assumed
for each protocol packet sent, independent on whether it is
a poll, request or broadcast. An estimate of PLR is defined
Contenting Nodes
Saturated transmission
Non-elastic traffic 
sources
Standard DCF
0.3 m 0.3 m
1 m
Main 
Coordinator
Protocol Member Nodes
Periodic Broadcast
802.11e (AC_VO’)
Channel 1Channel 1
MT 1
MT 2
Figure 2. Experimental setup used for performance measurements
as ̂PLRPR and is obtained from a statistic of failed poll-
requests at the access point.
Poll+Request Transmission Time [ms]: This metric
describes the time within a slot measured at the AP from the
moment of sending a poll until receiving the corresponding
request. The metric includes poll transmission time, poll
processing time at a node and the request transmission
time. The metric is calculated at the access point for each
successful poll-request pair.
Request to BC Completion Delay (δRCDC) [ms]: This
delay characterizes the time duration from the moment the
coordinator (access point) has received a broadcast message
for dissemination, until the time the access point has received
an acknowledgment from all protocol member nodes. Hence,
this metric assesses when the coordinator assumes a broad-
cast to be completed and when it can continue to process a
new message from the given source node.
Request to BC Reception Delay (δRRDD) [rounds]:
The broadcast reception delay is a distributed measurement
using round numbers as granularity. It describes the delay
measured in terms of number of rounds from when the
coordinator has received a broadcast message for dissem-
ination, until the message has been received first time by all
protocol member nodes. As each broadcast message contains
a retransmission number, this metric can be derived as a
discrete round time metric based on node and AP recordings.
C. Experimental Evaluation Scenario
The setup used for the experimental studies is introduced
in Figure 2. It consists of two sets of communication devices:
1) The devices implementing the TRC protocol given by the
Main Coordinator access point and two Protocol Member
Nodes and 2) a node set of contending nodes communicating
via the AP. All nodes are operating in the same wireless
channel (channel 1). Thus, the protocol member nodes must
contend on the channel with the Contending Nodes.
150
Table II
GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION SETTINGS.
Setting Value Setting Value
Contending
Nodes
2 Slot length 50ms
Protocol
Member
Nodes
2 res(high)=OD 15
Experiment
Duration
30min Wireless Mode 802.11b
BC Payload 58 bytes PHY Rate 11Mbit/s
BC Frame
Size
92 bytes 802.11e setting:
AC_VO’
AIFSN =
1, CWmin =
4 slot times,
CWmax = 7
slot times
The contending nodes are configured as standard DCF
nodes (without 802.11e). These stereotypes are the most
common in existing deployments (in offices, homes etc.).
In the cross-traffic scenario both nodes are running with a
saturated transmission buffer constantly trying to transmit
1506 byte frames to represent a worst-case load. It must
further be noted that all wireless devices are located in close
proximity. This means that signal conditions are good and
that most experienced losses can be attributed to collisions
and interference. Interference is likely, as the testbed setup
has been deployed in an office scenario with around 12 other
access points operating in the 2.4 GHz frequency band. The
channel selected for the tests has been chosen such that it
contains the fewest other access points. Each experimental
execution run takes 30 minutes.
Detailed information on the parameters used for the
experimental results are provided in Table II.
D. Experimental Results
The experimental results have been obtained from an
execution with and without cross-traffic. The access point
notifies a protocol member node when its previous broadcast
has been completed in a poll. In the same slot, the node
prepares and sends a new broadcast in the request. With
this approach, a node performs only one broadcast at the
time, and we can thus disregard any queuing in the following
analysis (although this aspect must be considered in future
work).
The overall outcome of the experiments is summarized in
Table III. The main findings are:
• A high packet loss rate has been observed with cross-
traffic enabled of almost 18%. This high increase
is mainly expected to stem from collisions with the
contending nodes. As no re-transmissions are enabled
on layer 2, the node does not get the advantage of
implementing a smaller contention window compared
to the contending nodes (which have retracted form
the medium as well) for a fast retransmission. Future
work should consider if 1-2 fast (Layer 2) retransmis-
sions could provide an advantage without increasing
transmission delays significantly. Despite the high loss
rate the protocol largely runs fine still. The simulation
analysis clarifies this aspect in more detail.
• Even for the case without cross traffic a substantial loss
rate is observed of 3.5%. These losses may stem from
other interfering nodes in wireless neighbor channels
or hidden nodes.
• In the average case, the request to broadcast completion
delay increases by around 70ms for δRCDC for a node
when cross-traffic is activated.
• The maximum value δRRDD (worst case) in Table
III with cross-traffic OFF stems from the transmission
irregularities, where a nodes requires that many rounds
to finally receive the broadcast.
• When studying the general protocol execution an ir-
regularity has been identified in the communication
from the mobile nodes participating in the TRC. The
irregularity consists of a systematic transmission inter-
ruption of 1 seconds, approximately every 60 seconds.
The interruption is TRC protocol independent as it also
occurs when running periodic message transmissions
with test tools (using mgen and wireshark monitoring
traces). This interruption is presumably a driver issue
that must be solved in future implementations. The
irregularity to a large extent does not influence the
measurement data for the processing of intra-slot delay
metrics. But it has an impact on BC reception delay,
see further below.
• An impact of the node transmission irregularity can best
be observed in relation to disconnects. Recall, that the
coordinator will consider a node to be disconnected if it
has not responded for OD+1 rounds. In the cross-traffic
case two of such disconnects have been observed. These
are expectedly a result of the transmission irregularity
that can stop the node from responding for a large
part of a round. Together with the added delays and
losses from cross-traffic, this provokes disconnects.
This is especially the case with a small set of nodes
and small slot sizes, because a single irregularity will
severely affect the nodes ability to communicate within
the protocol’s upper bound limit. For the similar run
without cross-traffic, no disconnects are observed. Here
the redundancy of the protocol is sufficient to avoid the
interruption.
The effects of the cross-traffic scenario are best observed
in Figure 3. It shows the distribution of the poll+request
transmission times (and associated processing time). It is
seen that in both cases, this message flow is completed
within a few ms. Even for the cross-traffic case the transmis-
sion times are far from the intra-slot timeout of 40ms. This
aspect can partially be described by the aggressive channel
access scheme applied through 802.11e and the fact that only
a single transmission is attempted. In normal DCF, eleven
151
Table III
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS.
Experiment Parameter Value
Cross-traffic OFF
̂PLRPR 0.035
Disconnects 0
δRRDD (avg./max) 0.2/12 [rounds]
δRCDC (avg./max) 117/1405 [ms]
corresponding to 2.3/28 [slots]
Cross-traffic ON
̂PLRPR 0.177
Disconnects 2 (Node 1)
δRRDD (avg./max) 0.12/10 [rounds]
δRCDC (avg./max) 188/1480 [ms]
corresponding to 3.8/29 [slots]
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Figure 3. Transmission time distributions for successful poll and request
message pairs in a 50 millisecond slot (joint over both nodes).
retries are standard, which in conjunction with increasing
channel backoff times can lead to excessive delays.
These results are encouraging to evaluate shorter slot
times. This aspect will be studied in the simulation model
evaluation which uses these delay distributions as an input.
Having established in Table III the fundamental settings
of the experimental results, the cumulative distribution func-
tions in Figure 4 depict several interesting aspects regarding
the broadcast transmission delays. The upper figure shows
the case without cross-traffic. Considering initially δRCDC
(dark color), it is clear that most broadcasts (around 99%)
are successfully completed after round 3. In practice, most
nodes have received the broadcast already in second round
(in around 99% of the cases). All messages are successfully
completed within the 16 (OD+1) rounds. This implies that
no disconnects are observed.
Studying the cross-traffic case in the lower part, it can
be observed that all nodes receive most broadcasts (around
99%) already in round 3. However, only at round 9, the
coordinator has received all acknowledgements. This impact
clearly stems from the increased packet loss rate. In the
cross-traffic case, we observe that OD+1 has been exceeded
two times, i.e., two disconnects have been observed.
E. Simulation Based Results
In order to extend the observations of the experimental
results, the TRC simulation model has been parameterized
from the experimental results. The parametrization has been
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Figure 4. Comparison of broadcast delays with (lower figures) and without
(upper figures) cross-traffic. The gray color shows the time until broadcast
reception at the MT, while the dark color shows the time until all Acks
have been received by the AP. The right part shows a zoom into the left
curves. The curves show a step function with width of the steps equal to
the slot-time of 50ms, as the reception events are evaluated at the end of
each slot.
based on the estimated packet loss ratios provided in Table
III, and the delay distributions of Figure 3. In the simulation
model packet losses are assumed to be independent. Also,
a broadcast is considered to be received by all nodes or
no node at all, resembling the experimental test setup with
spatially close nodes where packet losses are only resulting
from collisions which affect all receiving nodes equally. In
terms of transmission delays, the poll and request durations
are sampled from the empirical delay distribution within the
range up to the 90 percent quantile. Both with and without
cross-traffic, long tails have been observed in the measure-
ments with delay samples up to 40ms in rare cases. Also,
as the slot moves on with a broadcast after 40ms, longer
delays that may have occurred are not in the distributions.
As these longer delays are important to simulate, the tail
of this distribution has been fitted separately. To mimic the
high variability, a 2-parameter Pareto distribution has been
fitted to match the largest 10% of the data of the empirical
delay distribution. This fitted Pareto distribution is then used
in the simulations for the tail samples.
Regarding the parts of the delay distribution before the
Pareto tail, the experiments provide a delay distribution of
the poll and request pair. To define a delay distribution for
the individual transmission of a broadcast, the following
assumption has been made: a poll and a request individ-
ually experience delays sampled from an independent and
identically distributed shifted exponential (shifted as there
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Figure 5. Comparison of experimental and model results of the broadcast
request to completion delay.
is a minimum transmission delay). Thus, it is assumed
that the joint distributions is a shifted 2-stage Erlangian,
and that the parameters of the exponentials can easily be
determined via least square fitting. Combining this shifted
exponential sampling with the Pareto tail sampling, the
simulation model can now be executed with parameters
matching the experimental results.
Validation of simulation model: To assess the results
from the simulation model in comparison to the experimental
results, a comparison of the ’request to completion’ delay
produced by both is shown in Figure 5.
The results show generally a good correspondence be-
tween the simulation model and experimental results. How-
ever, in the cross traffic case the simulation model is gener-
ally a little more optimistic. A part of the explanation may
stem from the fact that packet loss ratios to the individual
nodes are not completely alike and also not independent
identically distributed in reality (leading to some shifts in
times to when a broadcast can be considered completed).
The simulation model does not capture this effect. Another
aspect is the systematic transmission interruptions in the
simulation runs that make the tails a bit longer for the
experimental results compared to the model (which does not
include these long transmission interruption delays). As was
observed that the transmission interruption delays are not
related to the TRC design and implementation on DCF, we
concluded that the slightly more optimistic model produces
valid evaluation results.
Extrapolation of results: Having parameterized the
simulation model, several extrapolation analysis experiments
can be conducted via the simulation. Most interesting is
to clarify how the protocol will operate in scaled up
scenarios (to match the scenarios introduced in Section
II) with more mobile terminals participating in the timed
reliable broadcast. Further, the application-specific worst-
case requirement for delivering a safety-critical message is
10 seconds (Section II-A). According to the experimental
results above, an OD of 15 is sensible to the retransmission
attempts experienced, and makes it possible to tolerate
significant interruptions in the transmission – see Figure 4.
This leads to analyzing shorter slot sizes below 50ms. With
the TRC protocol worst-case execution time corresponding
to 2×OD + 1 rounds, we analyze cases of:
• S1: 20 nodes, slot size = 15ms (P+R Failed Timeout
of 5ms)
• S2: 16 nodes, slot size = 20ms (P+R Failed Timeout
of 8ms)
• S3: 12 nodes, slot size = 25ms (P+R Failed Timeout
of 8ms)
• S4: 10 nodes, slot size = 30ms (P+R Failed Timeout
of 10ms)
• S5: 6 nodes, slot size = 50ms (P+R Failed Timeout of
10ms)
The case S1 with 20 nodes is interesting because it
matches one of our use-case scenarios with its typical maxi-
mum set of communicating nodes. Here, the slot size has to
be reduced to 15ms to still be able to complete a broadcast
within 10 seconds (at the given value of OD = 15). The
second scenario increases the slot size to 20ms, S3 to
25ms, S4 to 30ms, and S5 to 50ms, leading to number of
nodes 16, 12, 10, 6, respectively, such that the broadcast can
finish in the time bound of 10 seconds. According to Figure
3, a large part of the Poll and Request exchanges will finish
well before 30ms.
From a safety-critical perspective, a hazard event can be
considered when a message is not successfully transmitted
within the time deadline or when a node is disconnected
(and cannot receive safety-critical event notifications). In
the studied case these two events are actually the same.
To assess to which extent such events can be avoided
in the operation period of the communication system, we
analyze the probability estimate that a 12-hour workday
passes without any disconnections. The test setup is such
that after completion of an ongoing broadcast, the node will
immediately schedule a new broadcast in its next slot.
The following extrapolation results are shown for nodes
under the cross-traffic scenario. For nodes under the non
cross-traffic scenario, the selected slot durations and P+R
Failed Timeouts of settings S1 to S5 do not significantly
affect the disconnect probability results, due to the compa-
rably short Poll-Request delays, see Figure 3. Therefore, the
non cross-traffic case is omitted here.
Figure 6 shows the probability estimators created from
each 200 simulation runs of 12 hours simulated time under
the cross-traffic scenario. The settings with the longest slot-
times (and less than 20 nodes), S4 with 30ms, S3 with
25ms as well as S5 with 50ms slot duration, complete
the workday with 0 and 2 disconnects in all 200 runs,
respectively. S2 has 6 disconnects. The scenario S1 with
15ms slot durations runs exhibit a high probability of
disconnect. For each estimator, the 95% confidence interval
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Figure 7. Number of disconnects per hour.
is given. The number of broadcasts in each setting before
disconnect still increases from S1 to S5, with (rounded)
12127, 45808, 53011, 58967, and 67868 in the mean.
A further illustration of the disconnection behavior of
Scenario S1 (15ms slot duration) is shown in Figure 7.
The figure shows the histogram of the time to disconnect
resulting from the 200 simulation runs for S1, and the 95%
confidence interval for each disconnect estimator. Almost
25% of runs disconnect during the first hour, and slightly
over 15% disconnect in the second hour. During hour 11 to
12, around 2,5% of TRC protocol runs result in a disconnect
of the node from the coordinator. Overally, only 9 runs out of
200 did not disconnect for the simulated 12-hour workday.
The results of S1 to S5 indicate that stable settings can
be found, but that optimizations must be considered to
further scale the solution. One option may be to re-introduce
Layer 2 retransmissions, using only one or two frame-
retransmissions to limit the frame time delay variability.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper describes the design and performance analysis
of a time-bounded protocol implemented on top of IEEE
802.11e DCF. A protocol based on 802.11 PCF for reliably
broadcasting messages in WLAN is adapted to the use-
case of a safety-critical warning system. A subset of these
adaptions is implemented for an experimental study. The
motivating use-case is message dissemination in a safety-
critical warning system, using off-the-shelf communication
equipment and technologies. Although the initial use-case
description and the performed evaluation targets a safety-
critical system for railway workers, the overall protocol
design is generic enough to apply to other scenarios with
similar safety and timing requirements. The performance
analysis is based on experimental measurement results that
are used to calibrate a stochastic simulation model.
The challenging part in using 802.11 with distributed
access to the communication channel is the inability to make
any guarantees on the number of other communicating nodes
on the same channel. Besides, wireless transmission exhibits
a high packet loss-rate compared to wired communication,
and are subject to interference of neighbour channels. DCF
adds message send delays which are variable due to the
default channel-sensing and backoff algorithm specified in
802.11. Therefore, the TRC protocol implementation on top
of DCF did not make use of link-layer retransmissions, to
better focus on the actual TRC protocol performance for our
evaluation. Instead, packet retransmissions were performed
by the broadcast protocol itself. Link-layer transmission was
employing 802.11e QoS prioritization. For the experimental
test setup, the QoS settings of 802.11e have been chosen to
allow an aggressive channel access behavior of the protocol.
The experimental study is conducted using one coordi-
nator and two terminal nodes. The metrics for evaluation
included packet loss ratio, poll+request transmission times
and the time from broadcast request to broadcast completion.
The test runs are both done with high-load cross-traffic on
the same channel, and without cross-traffic. With cross-
traffic on, a relatively high packet loss rate of 18% is
observed; despite the high packet loss, the protocol is still
able to successfully distribute and complete broadcasts. On
average, the request to broadcast completion time increases
by 70ms with cross-traffic enabled.
The stochastic simulation model serves both for validat-
ing the chosen experimental setup parameters, and allows
scaling the node and slot size parameters. The model uses a
mixture of the empirical delay distribution and a parametric
fit of the delay tails to draw samples for message delay.
Furthermore, the observed packet loss rate from the exper-
imental setup is used in the model. The simulation model
shows to correspond well to the experimental measurements.
It performs slightly more optimistic, which is caused by
independence assumptions on delay and packet loss, as well
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as by the irregularities of the node behavior caused by the
driver software in the experimental setup. The simulation
model is then used to analyze scenarios of extrapolated
settings with slot sizes from 15 to 50ms, together with
a higher number of nodes. The node number is chosen
in a way that the application-specific worst-case broadcast
completion time of 10 seconds is met. The results show that
disconnections due to failed broadcasts within a workday of
12 hours happen very rarely (0 to 2 in 200 runs) in scenarios
of 30 to 50ms slot sizes; such a disconnect requires the
affected worker node to move to a safe zone. The time
to disconnect is getting significantly shorter than 12 hours
for the other scenarios. Therefore, the current realization
can support at most 12 nodes. Future work will include
the development of analytic models for the disconnection
probability, such that the analysis of scenarios with very
low disconnection probabilities becomes computationally
feasible; alternatively, rare event techniques could facilitate
an efficient simulation analysis of such settings.
A future detailed study could analyze and compare the
protocol using various IEEE 802.11e settings, also in the
presence of other interfering nodes having QoS features
enabled. Additionally, the probable positive impact on packet
transmission success when allowing one or two link-layer
retransmissions should be evaluated.
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